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Abstract: Orthodox Christians in Poland have faced numerous attempts to be forced into union with the Roman Catholic Church, 
ranging from the thirteenth to the twentieth century. The first attempt at a union between the Roman Catholic Church and the Ortho-
dox Church took place as early as the mid-thirteenth century. Another attempt at forcing the Orthodox Church into union with Rome 
took place during the reign of Ladislaŭ II Yagiello. The problem of church union returned in the reign of  Alexander the Yagiellonian. 
When Ivan III rejected all projects for bringing the Florence such a union into practice, discussion on church union disappeared until 
the end of the sixteenth century.
The mission of the papal legate, Father Antonio Possevino, to Ivan IV, had been intended to draw Moscow into the union, and its 
failure caused the papacy to concentrate its efforts on the Orthodox Church in Poland. The Ruthenian bishops’ obedience to the Pope 
was officially announced on the 8 October 1596. The decisions of the Uniate-Catholic synod were met with numerous protests from 
the Orthodox clergy and nobility. The larger part of the clergy and the faithful, together with bishops remained in the Orthodox camp. 
Despite the failure of the Brest Synod in fully uniting Orthodox and Roman churches, new union projects concerning the Orthodox 
Church in Poland continued to arise prior to the end of 18th century.
The Vatican’s interest in the Orthodox Church in Central Europe was renewed at the end of the First World War.  On April 1st, 1917, 
the Pope created the Congregation for the Oriental Churches which was responsibile for all issues relating to the activities of all the 
Eastern denominations. Despite aims at unification, attempts at church union have had a negative influence on the relations between 
the Roman Catholic and Polish Orthodox Church in contemporary Poland. The result of centuries of attempts at unification under the 
Pope has been fragmentation and division.
Streszczenie: Wyznawców Kościoła prawosławnego w Polsce wielokrotnie próbowano zmusić do przyjęcia unii kościelnej i podpo-
rządkowania się władzy papieży. Po raz pierwszy próbę taka podjęto w połowie XIII wieku, kiedy to czyniono starania pozyskania do 
unii księcia halicko-wołyńskiego Daniela. Ponownie unię kościelną próbowano narzucić Cerkwi prawosławnej za panowania Włady-
sława Jagiełły. Sprawa unii kościelnej na ziemiach polskich wróciła za panowania Aleksandra Jagiellończyka. Ostatecznie, w wyników 
zabiegów Iwana III, odrzucającego wszelkie projekty urzeczywistnienia unii florenckiej, problem unii kościelnej nie był rozpatrywany 
aż do końca XVI w. 
Niepowodzenie misji legata papieskiego o. Antonio Possevina mającej na celu pozyskanie Moskwy do unii kościelnej, skłoniło pa-
piestwo do skoncentrowania swych wysiłków na Kościele prawosławnym w Rzeczypospolitej. Narzucona prawosławnym w 1596 r. 
unia brzeska przyniosła negatywne skutki dla Cerkwi i Rzeczypospolitej. Przy prawosławiu pozostała większa część duchowieństwa 
i wiernych z dwoma biskupami. Nowe projekty unijne wobec Kościoła prawosławnego w Rzeczypospolitej były podejmowane aż do 
końca XVIII wieku.
Zainteresowanie Watykanu Kościołem prawosławnym w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej było pod koniec I wojny światowej. W 1917 
r. papież powołał Kongregację do spraw Kościoła Wschodniego, która przejęła wszystkie sprawy związane z działalnością obrządków 
wschodnich. Problem unii kościelnej negatywnie zaczął wpływać na wzajemne relacje między Kościołem rzymskokatolickim i pra-
wosławnym w Polsce. Uniatyzm nie tylko nie przywróciły jedności między Kościołem wschodnim a zachodnim a nawet ową jedność 
oddalił. 
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Orthodox Christians in Poland have faced numer-
ous attempts to force them into a union with the Roman 
Catholic Church, ranging from the thirteenth to the twen-
tieth centuries. Although such attempts had as their goal 
the unification of Christendom, they had the opposite re-
sult – fragmentation.  As a result, church unions cannot 
be regarded as effective in promoting ecumenism or good 
relations among Christian faiths.
The first attempt at a union between the Roman Catho-
lic Church and an Orthodox Church took place as early as 
the mid-thirteenth century. Daniel, the duke of Volhynia 
and Halich (1239-1264), was encouraged to enter into a un-
ion and join the Roman Catholic Church by an emissary of 
Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254), the Italian Franciscan John 
de Piano Carpine.  After consulting with bishops, igumens 
(abbots), and boyars, the duke refused to subject the Or-
thodox Church of Halich to the pope. This refusal did not 
end the pope’s efforts to draw the Ruthenian dukes into the 
union, but papal missions in 1247 and 1248 were equally 
unsuccessful.1
The initial question of union arose from Daniel’s at-
tempts to become a crowned head of state, a king. Daniel 
also wanted to put one of his sons, Roman, on the Hungar-
ian throne – and Hungary was a Roman Catholic kingdom. 
To achieve his goal, Daniel arranged for his son to wed Ger-
trude, the daughter of the Hungarian king Bela IV (1235-
1270), in 1252.  However, the duke found a powerful oppo-
nent to his goal in the  Metropolitan Cyryl II (1247-1281), 
1  W. Abraham, Powstanie organizacji Kościoła łacińskiego na Rusi, 
vol. I, Lwów, 1904, p. 120-127; S.M. Solov’ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneshykh 
vremen, vol. II, Moscow, 1963, p. 334; F. Sielicki, Polsko-ruskie stosunki 
kulturalne do końca XV wieku, Wrocław, 1997, p. 78, 79; Α. Μιρόνοβιτζ, 
Εκκλησιαστικές Oυνίες στα πολωνικά έδαφη και οι συνέπειες αυτών, 
Białystok 2013, p. 3-26.
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who came from Halich Ruthenia, and played an important 
role in Hungarian politics.  The Metropolitan had already 
obtained a reaffirmation of all the privileges of the Ruthe-
nian Church and the cancellation of all tax duties on the 
clergy levied by the Tartar Khan.  When the Metropolitan 
met with the Byzantine emperor John Dukas (1222-1254) 
and Manuel II, Patriarch of Constantinople (1244-1255), in 
Nicaea, there were great consequences:  a breakdown in the 
talks regarding church union in the Ruthenian lands, the 
rejection of Daniel’s policy [of ties with Hungary] and the 
forging of new ties with Alexander Nevsky (1220-1263), 
the Prince of Novgorod.
The subject of church union quickly re-appeared in 
Cracow during a meeting between the papal legate Opizo 
of Mezzano and Duke Daniel. Opizo even brought the 
duke a crown sent by Pope Innocent IV.  According to the 
Latopis Hipacki, Daniel did not accept it, arguing that he 
“could not meet an envoy on foreign ground.”  To meet that 
objection, the legate followed the duke to Kholm, but it 
was not until December 1253 that Daniel met with Opizo 
in Drohiczyn, where the duke, his son Lev (1264-1301), 
and the Mazovian duke Siemowit were preparing for war 
against the Yotvingians (Jatvingians). Daniel assented to 
the coronation - to take place in the church in Drohiczyn 
- in return for Rome’s help in the war against the Tartars.
During the coronation, Opizo’s attempted to draw 
Daniel into a church union, but the papal legate failed.2 
Political conflicts with Roman Catholic states – Hungary, 
Poland [duke of Cracow Leszek the White (1194-1227)], 
and the Teutonic Knights’ Order - led the Orthodox clergy 
to oppose a closer relationship with the Church of Rome. 
The leaders of the Orthodox Church, and especially Met-
ropolitan Cyryl II, whose opinion Daniel had to consider, 
stood firmly against any union.3
During the reign of George I, duke of Halich (1301-
1315), Pope John XXII (1315-1334) hoped to use the good 
relations between George I and the Polish king Ladislaŭ 
the Elbow-High (Władysław Łokietek) to submit the Hal-
ich metropolitanate to the pope in Avignon, strengthening 
John XXII’s faction in the growing dispute over leadership 
of the Roman Catholic Church. The Pope addressed a bull 
to the duke Boleslav - George II, duke of Halich (1315-
1340), encouraged the duke to join the Roman Catholic 
Church. The pope sent a second envoy in 1327 and he tried 
to persuade the Polish king to influence the Ruthenian 
duke of Halich to come back to the Latin church.4 However, 
the Pope’s request was rejected; Ladislaŭ the Elbow-High 
understood the religious situation in Ruthenia and did not 
want to encourage such conversions.
2  H. Paszkiewicz, Z życia politycznego Mazowsza w XIII w., [in:] Księga ku 
czci profesora Oskara Haleckiego, Lwów 1935, p. 203-228. 
3  Makarii, Metropolitan of Moscow, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi, kn. 3, part 
1, Moscow, 1995, p. 332-333; W. Abraham, Powstanie organizacji Kościoła 
łacińskiego na Rusi, Lwów, 1904, p. 121-143; E. Golubinskii, Istoriia 
Russkoi Tserkvi, vol. II, Moscow, 1900, p. 82-86. 
4  A. Theiner, Vetera Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque 
finitimarum historiam illustrantia, vol. I, Rome, 1860, v. I, p. 383, 384; 
M. Hrushevs’kyi, Istoria Ukrainy-Rusy, vol. III, Kyïv, 1905, p. 134; W. Abra-
ham, Powstanie organizacji kościoła łacińskiego na Rusi, vol. I, p. 193. 
Another attempt at forcing the Orthodox Church into 
a union with Rome took place during the reign of Ladislaŭ 
(Władysław) II Yagiello (1386-1434), who supported unit-
ing the churches in contrast to his predecessor. In order 
to achieve this aim, Yagiello wanted to use the prestige of 
Metropolitan Cyprian (1389-1406) and his good relations 
with Constantinople. During two long stays in Lithuania 
and the Polish kingdom, Cyprian participated in talks re-
garding the church union.5 The discussions resulted in a 
correspondence (conducted in the name of the Polish king) 
with the Patriarchy of Constantinople, aiming at a church 
union. The Metropolitan and Ladislaŭ suggested calling 
for an ecumenical council in one of the Ruthenian towns, 
which would allow a theological discussion on the form of 
reunion, but the patriarch was sceptical about the recom-
mended site for the talks.6
Ladislaŭ II’s suggestion was meant to reunite the 
Church by subjecting the Orthodox churches to the papacy. 
Negotiations with Cyprian were to lead to direct talks with 
the Patriarch beyond the control of the Holy See. The talks 
indicated the need for organising a council and achieving 
church unity by discussing the differences in the dogma 
and rite.  In the 1390’s, the king found few supporters of 
this concept among the Roman Catholic clergy of the Pol-
ish kingdom: the Polish episcopate preferred a policy of 
Catholicisation in the Ruthenian lands through the devel-
opment of German and Polish settlements and the develop-
ment of a Roman Catholic network of churches.
Supported by the Polish king, the Lithuanian grand 
duke Vitold (1392-1430) decided to reshape the Orthodox 
church structure in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to bind 
it more closely to the Roman Catholic Church. In order 
to achieve this aim, a new, separate Kyïv Metropolitanate 
was to be created, adjusted to the boundaries of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania. The plan also foresaw that the hosp-
odar alone would name any new Metropolitan as well as 
talks with bishops on church union. This plan was put into 
action in 1414-1415.
In 1414, Vitold banished the visiting Kyïv Metropoli-
tan Focius (1408-1431) from Lithuania.7 At the same time, 
on behalf of the dukes and boyars of the Grand Duchy, he 
demanded that the Patriarch appoint a new Metropolitan.8 
Duke Vitold presented the Patriarch with his own candi-
5  Makarii, Istoria Russkoi Tserkvi, vol. IV, p. 79; T. M. Trajdos, Metropolici 
kijowscy Cyprian i Grzegorz Camblak a problemy Cerkwi prawosławnej 
w państwie polsko-litewskim u schyłku XIV i pierwszej ćwierci XV w., [in:] 
Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia, vol. II, Poznań 1985, p. 217, 218; 
A.  Mironowicz, Kościół prawosławny w państwie Piastów i Jagiellonów, 
Białystok, 2003, p.147-149. 
6  A. Lewicki, Sprawa unii kościelnej za Jagiełły, „Kwartalnik Historyczny”, 
vol. XI (1897),  p. 322; A. Prochaska, Władysław Jagiełło, vol. II, Cracow, 
1908, p. 119-120; E. Golubinskii, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi, vol. II, Moscow, 
1901, p. 338; K. Chodynicki, Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska, 
1370-1632, Warsaw, 1934, p. 43. 
7  Latopis Nowogrodzki, [in:] Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei (PSRL), vol. 
III. St Petersburg, 1841, p. 105; T.M. Trajdos, Metropolici kijowscy..., p. 225; 
A. Mironowicz, Kościół prawosławny w państwie Piastów i Jagiellonów, 
p. 169-170
8  E. Golubinskii, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi, vol. II, p. 369, 370; K. Cho-
dynicki, Kościół prawosławny..., p. 36.
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date, Gregory Tsamblak, who was the nephew of the late 
Metropolitan Cyprian.  Tsamblak was an outstanding Or-
thodox catechist, an igumen of the Serbian monastery in 
Kosmet, and had lived in Lithuania since 1406.9 He was also 
a highly respected Orthodox writer; his works were popu-
lar among the clergy as well as secular readers. Although 
the Patriarch rejected Vitold’s demands, a synod took place 
in Navahrudak on 15 November 1415 under the leadership 
of Vitold. It elected Tsamblak to be the Metropolitan of 
Lithuania and Kyïv (1415-1419).10 The new metropolitan 
was consecrated by the bishops present at the synod.
Facing the beginning of the Roman Catholic Council 
of Constance (1414-1418)  and increasing Roman Catho-
lic missionary activity in the east, the bishops participating 
in the synod in Navahrudak had to be aware of the con-
sequences of their decision. Both Ruthenian and Polish 
sources agree that the synod in Navahrudak was imposed 
by the Roman Catholic monarch and called simply to over-
throw Focius, the defender of Orthodoxy. Its rulings were 
intended to weaken the Orthodox Church and subjugate its 
followers to the Roman Catholic Church and the Lithuani-
an Grand Duke.11
Promoted within the Polish king’s and Lithuanian 
great duke’s circles, the issue of church union reappeared 
when Tsamblak became Metropolitan. Pope John XXII was 
personally interested in the union and he named Ladislaŭ 
II as protector of the Latin Church in the east with the right 
to convert the Orthodox and disseminate Roman Catholic 
propaganda.12 The first project for union was presented in 
the name of the king by John Stechir at the council of Con-
stance in January 1415.13 On 30 November 1417, Ladislaŭ II 
sent a report by the legates in Samogitia to the council, in-
forming it of his and Vitold’s energetic actions to win over 
the Orthodox. The king presented ways to make the Ortho-
dox subject to the Holy See and described the struggle with 
Focius. At the same time, the Metropolitan of Kyïv Focius 
induced the patriarchal synod to impose an anathema on 
Tsamblak. For those clergy who supported the new Metro-
politan, severe church punishments up to anathema were 
introduced. Therefore the union was only possible through 
the complete incorporation of the local Lithuanian Ortho-
dox church into the Roman Catholic Church.  No contacts 
with Constantinople took place, so the political conditions 
were very much different than in the times of Metropolitan 
Cyprian.
The only effective way of enforcing the church union 
was to announce it officially at the council in Constance. 
Ladislaŭ II was adamant in his desire to incorporate the 
9  K. S. Mechev, Grigorii Tsamblak, Sofia, 1969, p. 15-18.
10  Ibid, p. 180; Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii, vol. I, 
nos. 24/25 St. Petersburg 1846, p. 33; I. Daniłowicz, Skarbiec dyplomów 
papieskich, vol. II, Wilno, 1862, nr 1178, p. 44-45; K. Chodynicki, Kościół 
prawosławny..., p. 38-40; T. M. Trajdos, Metropolici kijowscy..., p. 224; 
A.  Mironowicz, Kościół prawosławny w państwie Piastów i Jagiellonów, 
p. 170.
11  T. M. Trajdos, Metropolici kijowscy..., p. 225, 226; A. Mironowicz, 
Kościół prawosławny w państwie Piastów i Jagiellonów, p. 171.
12  T.M. Tajdos, Metropolici kijowscy ..., p. 228
13  T. Silnicki, Sobory powszechne a Polska, Warsaw, 1962, p. 93.
Orthodox Church in the Polish-Lithuanian Common-
wealth into the Roman Catholic church. In his letter of 1 
January 1418, he congratulated Martin V on his election to 
the papal throne, while informing him of a delegation led 
by the Metropolitan Tsamblak, representing the Orthodox 
faithful from Lithuania, Moldavia, and the Kingdom of Po-
land. The Polish king stressed the Metropolitan’s learning 
and assured the Pope that the establishment of church un-
ion was the aim of this journey.14 Tsamblak reached Con-
stance in 1418, with six Orthodox bishops, a few presbyters, 
and some boyars and the delegation was granted an audi-
ence with Pope Martin V.15 Citing Ladislaŭ II’s direction, 
Tsamblak expressed his firm conviction of the need to unite 
the churches, to accept papal primacy, and to reverse the 
schism of the eleventh century. 
However, the Metropolitan made this important deci-
sion dependent on two conditions – a formal discussion 
in the council on dogmatic differences and the Byzantine 
Patriarch’s and Emperor’s participation in the union.16 
Tsamblak’s approach suggested a return to the concepts 
of 1396-1397, but the Byzantine emperor, Manuel II, was 
now unfavourably disposed towards the Latin Church. As a 
result of the Metropolitan’s conditions, no agreement con-
cerning the union could be reached. As a result, Ladislaŭ 
II’s union plans could not be fulfilled, but Tsamblak had 
also gone to Constance at the direction of Grand Duke Vi-
told, who now threatened the forcible incorporation of Ru-
thenians into Roman Catholicism.17
Tsamblak’s diplomatic talents told him to respect Ladis-
laŭ’s and Vitold’s instructions. Indeed, Tsamblak’s depend-
ency on the Yagiellonian dynasty was so great that he would 
never have been able to return to Kyïv had he implemented 
his own approach. He was fortunate that he managed to 
return from Constance without causing a breakdown in his 
relations with the two monarchs.
In contrast to the Ruthenian situation, the Turkish 
threat to Constantinople caused the Byzantine Greeks 
seeking military aid from the West to accept union with the 
Roman Catholic Church. At a council in Ferrara, and later 
in Florence (5 July 1439), bishops penned a treaty of union 
between the churches. While some of the Orthodox lords 
refused to sign the union treaty, others accepted it for prag-
matic reasons.18 The Metropolitan of Kyïv and an igumen 
of the St. Dimitry Monastery in Constantinople, Isidor the 
Greek, also took part in the council. 
Metropolitan Isidor (1437-1447), who earlier took part 
in the council of Basel in 1431, became a particularly ardent 
supporter of the concept of union. At the council in Flor-
ence, he actively supported the cause and willingly signed 
the council statements.  As a result, he was soon appointed 
14  T. M. Trajdos, Metropolici kijowscy..., p. 230. 
15  J. Fijałek, Biskupstwa greckie..., p. 48-50; J. Kłoczowski, Młodsza 
Europa, Warsaw, 1998, p. 333. 
16  A. Prochaska, Władysław Jagiełło, vol. II, Cracow, 1908, p. 397; K. Cho-
dynicki, Kościół prawosławny..., p. 46. 
17  PSRL, vol. V, p. 260; T. M. Trajdos, Metropolici kijowscy..., p. 230.
18  S. Runciman, Wielki kościół w niewoli, Warsaw, 1973, p. 116-126; 
B.  Gudziak, Unia florencka a metropolia kijowska, [in:] S. Stępnia, ed., 
Polska – Ukraina. 10000 lat sąsiedztwa Przemyśl, 1994, p. 19. 
162 ELPIS · 16 · 2014
cardinal and legate for the eastern European countries by 
Pope Eugene IV. Isidor left Rome and returned to Ruthe-
nia, penning a letter on 5 March 1440 from Buda which 
informed the faithful of the union and calling for its im-
plementation.19 For a few months in 1440, he remained in 
the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
promoting the Florence Union, but his appeals were not re-
ceived with enthusiasm either by the Orthodox or by the 
Roman Catholic clergy. Most of the Orthodox faithful saw 
the union as a threat to their religious identity while the 
Orthodox clergy and secular magnates stood firmly against 
the union. As a result, the Florence Union was rejected by 
the Eastern Church’s faithful and had no impact in Poland 
or Lithuania.
***
A second attempt at implementing the Florence Un-
ion in Poland came in 1474, when the Orthodox bishop of 
Smolensk, Misael Pstruch, became Metropolitan of Kyïv.20 
Casimir the Yagiellonian (1447-1492) made acceptance of 
the Florence Union a condition for Pstruch’s acceptance of 
his appointment.  Pressed by the king and the papal nuncio 
Antonio Bonumbre, the Metropolitan allegedly sent a letter 
to Pope Sixtus IV  (1471-1484) on 14 March 1476.  In this 
letter, the Metropolitan expressed a willingness to join the 
Union, but also accused Roman Catholics of persecuting 
Orthodox believers although the Union had been expected 
to ensure understanding and peace between the Church-
es. In his memorial, the Metropolitan underlined that the 
Ruthenians showed a respect for the Pope that was equal 
to their respect for the patriarchs of the East. In his mind, 
unity with the Roman church did not mean breaking with 
the Patriarchate in Constantinople. The memorial was also 
supposedly signed by thirteen representatives of the Lithu-
anian and Ruthenian nobility.21
Misael’s 1476 message from the Ruthenian clergy and 
nobility to Pope Sykstus IV is considered dubious. The 
original has been lost and it was only in 1605 that the Un-
iate Metropolitan Hipacy Pociej (1599-1613) identified a 
copy and had it printed.  According to Rev. Jan Fijałek, Mi-
sael’s letter cannot be authentic because it is written in sev-
enteenth-century language. This scholar suspects the letter 
was created to support the later Union of Brest.22
The problem of church union returned in the reign 
of  Alexander the Yagiellonian (1501-1506). Alexander 
became Grand Duke of Lithuania  in 1492 and two years 
19  M. Harasiewicz, Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae, Leopolis, 1862, p.  77, 
78; E. Golubinskii, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi, vol. II, p. 448, 449. For 
Metropolitan Isidor’s activities during 1439-1440, see J. Dlugosz, Historiae 
Polonicae, liber XII, Opera omnia, vol. V, (ed. A. Przeździecki), Cracow, 
1869, p. 566, 578-580. 
20  J. Wolff, Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy, Warsaw, 1895, p. 669, 670.
21  W. Hryniewicz, Prekursor unijnych dążeń Rusinów. Memoriał unijny 
metropolity Mizaela, [in:] R. Łużny, F. Ziejko i A. Kępiński, eds., Unia 
brzeska, geneza, dzieje i konsekwencje w kulturze narodów słowiańskich 
Cracow,1994, p. 54-65; A. Mironowicz, Kościół prawosławny w państwie 
Piastów i Jagiellonów, p. 192.
22 . Fijałek, Los unii florenckiej w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim za Kazi-
mierza Jagiellończyka, „Sprawozdanie z czynności i posiedzeń Polskiej 
Akademii Umiejętności”, vol. XXXIX (1934), p. 23-25.
later, married Helena, the daughter of the Grand Duke of 
Muscovy, Ivan III (1462-1505), and a descendent of the last 
Byzantine emperor.  (Her mother, Sophia Paleologus had 
lived in Rome after the fall of Constantinople and became 
Ivan III’s second wife.)23 After the marriage, there were at-
tempts in 1499 to convince Helena to convert to Roman 
Catholicism.24 The Grand Duke of Moscow accused Alex-
ander, Metropolitan Joseph of Kyïv (1492-1501), the bish-
op of Vilnius Wojciech Tabor (1491-1507), and Bernardine 
monks of forcing Helena to change her faith and of build-
ing Roman Catholic churches in areas where only the Or-
thodox lived. Regardless of this pressure, Helena refused to 
join the Latin Church.25
The new metropolitan of Kyïv, Joseph Bulharynovich, 
a lord of Smolensk, assumed his position with the support 
of Alexander and was accepted in his new position by Pa-
triarch Nifont II (1497-1502) in 1500. After receiving the 
Patriarch’s blessing, Metropolitan Joseph addressed the 
Pope, expressing the desire to join the union of Florence. 
This position was supported by Alexander who sought to 
have his marriage with an Orthodox princess accepted by 
Rome. However, Pope Alexander VI (1492-1503) demand-
ed that the Metropolitan surrender all titles received from 
the Patriarch.  In contrast to the Polish clergy, the Pope did 
not require the re-christening of Ruthenians who joined 
the Roman Catholic Church, but he informed Alexander 
(now king of Poland since 1501) that he could not accept 
Metropolitan Joseph under his jurisdiction because he had 
been consecrated by the Patriarch of Constantinople Nifont 
and not the Uniate Patriarch John.  Joseph naturally did not 
accept this position.26
In any case, the Roman Catholic episcopate was more 
interested in developing its own church structure than in 
supporting the union. The Polish Catholic bishops sought 
to increase their influence by developing church confra-
ternities, supporting Bernardine missions, and convert-
ing Jews and Orthodox believers; contemporary Roman 
Catholic theologians believed that the Orthodox could not 
reach salvation through their distinctive faith.27 When Ivan 
III rejected all projects for bringing the Florence union into 
practice, discussion of church union disappeared until the 
end of the sixteenth century.
***
Subjecting the Eastern Church faithful became one 
of the prime objectives for Rome following the Council of 
23   S. M. Solov’ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, vol. III, p. 111-113; 
F. Sielicki, Polsko-ruskie stosunki kulturalne..., p. 112, 113.
24 W. Białowiejska, Stosunki Litwy z Moskwą w I połowie panowania 
Aleksandra Jagiellończyka (1492-1499), „Ateneum Wileńskie”, VII, Wilno, 
1930, p. 778-781; K. Pietkiewicz, Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie pod rządami 
Aleksandra Jagiellończyka, Poznań, 1995, p. 166.
25 J. Garbacik, Helena, [in:] Polski Słownik Biograficzny, t. IX, Wrocław – 
Warsaw, 1960, p. 362.
26  K. Chodynicki, Kościół prawosławny..., p. 71-72.
27  J. Fijałek, Kościół rzymskokatolicki na Litwie. Uchrześcijanienie Litwy 
przez Polskę i zachowanie w niej języka ludu pod koniec Rzeczypospolitej, 
[in:] Polska i Litwa w dziejowym stosunku, Cracow 1914, p. 260-264; 
K. Pietkiewicz, Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie..., p. 169; A. Mironowicz, Koś-
ciół prawosławny w państwie Piastów i Jagiellonów, p. 198-199.
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Trent (1545-1563). The mission of the papal legate, Father 
Antonio Possevino (1534-1611), to Ivan IV, Tsar of all the 
Russias (1547-1584) since 1547, had been intended to draw 
Moscow into the union, but its failure caused the papacy to 
concentrate its efforts on the Orthodox Church in Poland. 
The creation of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1589 was an ad-
ditional impulse for this transfer of interest for Rome feared 
that the new Patriarch could control the Orthodox Church 
in Poland. Popes Pius V (1566-1572) and Klemens VIII 
(1592-1605) saw the union of the churches in the Kingdom 
of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a way of 
linking Rome with Moscow. This initiative was support-
ed by Stefan Batory (1576-1586) and Sigismund III Vasa 
(1587-1632) since both monarchs supported the reforms 
of the Trent council and the policy of Rome towards the 
Orthodox church. Nuncio Possevino gave the Jesuits the 
task of implementing the union by preparing a synod and 
gaining the support of the Orthodox magnates. The prepa-
ration and the course of the synod in Brest in 1594 already 
led some of the Commonwealth’s Orthodox inhabitants to 
accept Rome’s spiritual leadership.28  
During the Reformation in Poland during the sixteenth 
century, the position of the Orthodox Church was weak-
ened when many representatives of prominent noble fam-
ilies converted to Protestantism and Roman Catholicism29. 
The internal disorganisation of the Orthodox Church also 
seemed to call for unification; the Orthodox hierarchy 
was particularly susceptible to such thinking, particularly 
since many of the higher clergy did not follow Orthodox 
canons.30 No wonder that talks on accepting the Pope’s su-
premacy were mostly conducted with Ruthenian bishops.
The decisions of the 1594 synod had great influence on 
bringing the union project to life. The synod found Gideon 
28 A. Ammann, Abriss der ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte, Vienna, 1950, 
p. 212-214; K. Chodynicki, Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska. 
Zarys historyczny 1370-1632, Warsaw 1934, p. 204-346; O. Halecki, From 
Florance to Brest (1439-1596), Rome 1958, p. 367-370; M. Hrushevs’kyi, 
Istoriia Ukrajiny-Rusy, vol. VII, Kyïv,1909, p. 540-564; T. Kempa, Książę 
Konstanty Ostrogski, wojewoda kijowski i marszałek ziemi wołyńskiej, 
Toruń 1997, p. 119-170; M. O. Koialovich, Litovskaia Tserkovnaia uniia, 
vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1861, p. 150-161, 305-308; B. Kumor, Geneza 
i zawarcie unii brzeskiej, [in:] R. Łużny, F. Ziejko i A. Kępiński, eds., Unia 
brzeska, geneza, dzieje i konsekwencje w kulturze narodów słowiańskich 
Cracow, 1994, p. 26-44; J.S. Gajek i S. Nabywaniec, eds., Unia brzeska 
z perspektywy czterech stuleci Lublin, 1998, p. 27-56; K. Lewicki, Książę 
Konstanty Ostrogski a unia brzeska 1596 r., Lwów, 1933; E. Likowski, Unia 
brzeska, Poznań, 1889, p. 67-167; Makarii, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi, vol. IX, 
St Petersburg, 1880, p. 571-590; A. Mironowicz, Wokół sporu o przyczyny 
unii brzeskiej, [in:] “Białoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne”, nr 2 (4), Białystok 
1995, p. 23-38; J. Pelesz, Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit 
Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart, vol. II, Würzburg-Wien 
1881; A. Pekar, The Union of Brest and Attempts to  Destroy it, „Analecta 
Ordinis S. Basilii Magni”, seria II, vol. XIV (XX), Rome 1992; S. Załęski, 
Jezuici w Polsce, vol. I, Lwów, 1900, p.306-317.
29  A. Mironowicz, Ours or Others. Orthodox Population in the Multi-faith 
and Multicultural Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the 16th to the 
18th Century, [in:] Das Bild Des Feindes. Konstruktion von Antagonismen 
und Kulturtransfer im Zeitalter der Türkenkriege. Ostmitteleuropa, Italien 
und Osmanisches Reich, unter redaktioneller Eckhard Leuschner und 
Thomas Wünsch, Berlin 2013, p. 151-162.
30  P. N. Batiushkov, Kholmskaia Rus’, VII, St. Petersburg 1885, p. 106-107; 
A. Mironowicz, Podlaskie ośrodki i organizacje prawosławne w XVI i XVII 
w., Białystok, 1991, p. 107-108.
Balaban, bishop of  L’viv (1576-1607), guilty in his conflict 
with the brotherhood of L’viv and Metropolitan Michael 
Rahoza (1588-1596) excommunicated him. In addition, 
many reforms were made in the inner organisation of the 
Church, particularly for parish schools and clerical  broth-
erhoods. Thanks to the synod’s decisions, the brotherhoods 
were strengthened at the cost of the bishops’ powers. Dis-
satisfied with the Matropolitan’s decisions, Cyryl Terlecki, 
bishop of Lutsk (1585-1596), organised a meeting in Sokal 
with three bishops [Balaban of L’viv, Dionizy Zbirujski 
of Kholm (1585-1596), Michael Kopystenski of Przemyśl 
(1591-1610)], where they prepared a new project for sub-
jecting the Ruthenian Church to the papacy as well as a 
declaration of union. Supported by Chancellor Jan Zam-
oyski (1587-1605), the bishop of Lutsk Cyryl Terlecki went 
to Metropolitan Michael with a completed draft for an act 
of unification. The Metropolitan made three conditions: 
royal guarantees of equality between Orthodox and Roman 
Catholic clergy, protection of the Ruthenian bishops from 
the Patriarchs and their envoys, and placing the Orthodox 
lords in the Polish senate.31 Representatives of the Roman 
Catholic clergy under Lutsk’s bishop, Bernard Maciejowski 
(1588-1600), took an active part in this stage of negotia-
tions.
Sigismund III approved the project along with two of 
the Metropolitan’s three conditions; the king would not 
grant seats in the senate to Orthodox bishops. The king ar-
gued that it was not within his powers to make such an im-
portant decision concerning the Polish-Lithuanian Com-
monwealth’s senate.  The Metropolitan and the Ruthenian 
bishops accepted the Polish king’s position and, under the 
monarch’s influence, the Metropolitan called for a synod to 
be held in Brest on 12 June 1595. The Ruthenian bishops 
sent two addresses, one to Pope Klemens VIII and anoth-
er to King Sigismund III (1587-1632). In the first address, 
Ruthenian bishops asked to be taken under the Pope’s 
guidance, but with a guarantee that they would retain the 
eastern liturgy and Orthodox rites. In the letter to the king, 
the bishops asked for royal protection and support for the 
union.32
Prior to these events, Hipacy Pociej and Cyril Terlecki 
went to Rome as plenipotentiaries of the king and Rutheni-
an episcopate. Upon arriving in Rome in November 1595, 
the Ruthenian bishops presented 32 articles prepared by 
the synod detailing their conditions for accepting the un-
ion. For example, they demanded Rome accept their own 
distinct religious tradition and identity. The Pope called 
for a special commission to look into these conditions. The 
papal commission concluded that since membership in 
the Roman Church is necessary for salvation, it cannot be 
subject to any preconditions. The Ruthenian bishops had 
to bow to this decision and they made a Roman Catho-
lic profession of faith to the Pope. On the same day, the 
Pope issued the bull Magnus Dominu et laudabilis nimis, 
informing the Roman Catholic world that the Ruthenians 
31  Akty Zapadnoi Rossii, vol. IV, p. 53-54.
32 Ibid. nr 68. 
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had joined the Union.33 The final formula was taken from 
the Tridentine creed (previously used by Pope Gregory XIII 
(1572-1585) in 1575 for the Greeks). The axiom extra Eccle-
siam Romanam nulla salus was added by Pope Urban VIII 
(1623-1644) to the vows of the new Uniate bishops.34
This act did not return sacramental unity between 
Rome and the Orthodox Church in the Polish-Lituanian 
Commonwealth. As an act of canon law, the Union sub-
jected the Commonwealth’s Orthodox to papal rule. It 
also declared that the Orthodox had been excluded from 
Christianity before the union:  only by accepting the Pope’s 
jurisdiction could they receive salvation.  Magnus Domi-
nus clearly stated that the Ruthenian bishops were accepted 
into the Roman Catholic Church, not as a sister church, but 
as separate individuals entering into the Church. The act 
made no mention the bishop’s synodal decision concerning 
the Union. 
The expectations of the Ruthenian nobility were differ-
ent, but they agreed to Rome’s dictates.35  After the Ruthe-
nian lords visited Rome, the Pope sent letters to the king 
and Latin episcopate asking them to help the Ruthenian 
bishops organise a union synod. In a proclamation of 14 
June 1596, Sigismund III accordingly directed, the clergy 
and faithful of the Orthodox Church to call a synod, during 
which the unity of the Greek and Roman churches would 
be officially declared. On 21 August,  Metropolitan Michael 
called for the synod to be held in Brest on 6 October 1596.36 
This synod was opposed by the Alexandrian Patriarch Me-
lecius Pigas (1590-1601), his emissary exarch Cyril Lukarys 
(1596-1602), the protosingle to the patriarchal see in Con-
stantinople Nicefor (1595-1599), and most of the Ortho-
dox clergy and faithful. In his letter to the prince of Ostrog 
Constantin of 30 August 1596, Pigas called upon the clergy 
and faithful to reject the union.37 Nevertheless, the Ortho-
dox party opposing the union decided to take part in the 
synod, asking the king to permit dissenters and the exarch 
Nicefor; Sigismund III agreed.  The king sent his own em-
issaries in addition to papal legates and Jesuits to the synod. 
Many Ruthenian bishops took part in the pro-union synod, 
but only a few representatives of the clergy and the faithful.
In contrast, the anti-union opposition appeared in 
greater numbers. This party included the bishop of L’viv 
Gideon Balaban, the bishop of Przemyśl Michael Kopys-
tenski, the exarch of the Tsarogrod [Constantinople] Patri-
arch Nicefor, the exarch of the Alexandrian Patriarch Cyril 
Lukarys, the Metropolitan of Bialograd [Bilgorod] Lukas, 
as well as bishops and archimandrites from other countries. 
The Orthodox fraction included ten archimandrites, six-
33 M. Harasimowicz, Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae, Lwów, 1862, p. 193-194, 
202-214; A. Theiner, Vetera Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae, vol. III 
(1585- 1696), Rome, 1863, p. 232-249. 
34 W. Hryniewicz, Przeszłość zostawić Bogu. Unia i uniatyzm w perspek-
tywie ekumenicznej, Opole, 1995, p.61-62. 
35 Ibid, p. 66; A. Mironowicz, Kościół prawosławny w dawnej Rzeczy-
pospolitej, p. 61. 
36 Arkhiv Iugo Zapadnoi Rossii, cz. I, vol. 1, nr 120, p. 501-504; Akty 
Zapadnoj Rossii, vol. IV, nr 100.
37 . I. I. Malyshevskii, Aleksandriiskii patriarkh Meletii Pigas i ego uczastie 
w dielakh Russkoi Tserkvi, vol. II, Prilozheniee, p. I, Kyïv 1872, p. 28-44.
teen protopopes, and over 200 members from lower clergy. 
Most urban representatives came from Orthodox Church 
brotherhoods: eight from Vilnius, five from Bielsk, three 
from L’viv.  Also present were a large group of representa-
tives of the Orthodox nobility as well as citizens from towns 
and cities from 15 city districts and counties:  L’viv (three 
representative), Vilnius (four), Bielsk, Pinsk, Brest, Podha-
jec, Halich, Kyïv, Skalsko, Braclav, Kamenets, Vladimir, 
Minsk, Slutsk i Lutsk.38 
According to Orthodox canon law, the only group en-
titled to make decisions at the synod was the anti-union 
fraction. The Orthodox Church in Poland was formally 
under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople 
for the Ruthenian church was in ecclesiastical unity  with 
Byzantium.  Nicefor, who attended the synod, was fully 
competent to lead the Orthodox Church in Poland: he had 
received such powers in 1592 from Patriarch Jeremiah II 
when receiving the title of “protosingle to the patriarchal 
see” as the Patriarch’s deputy.  After the Patriarch’s death, 
this authority was not revoked. The exarch Nicefor there-
fore had the right to lead local church councils in Poland, 
even in the presence of the Metropolitan of Kyïv.  Moreo-
ver, Cyril Lukarys, who later became Patriarch of Alexan-
dria (1602-1620), was also an exarch and possessed similar 
competence. In contrast, the bishops who had left the Or-
thodox Church and broken ties with the patriarchate had to 
face canonic exclusion. This argument carried great moral 
weight with the participants of the Orthodox council. 
Moreover, Orthodox could regard the 1595 pro-union 
synod in Brest as improperly constituted.  The participation 
of the clergy of different levels and the faithful was not only 
a custom, but the traditional law of the Orthodox Church, 
confirmed by the patriarchs.  By rejecting the legal partici-
pation of secular elements, the pro-union synod discarded 
a prime rule of Orthodox Church organisation – concili-
arity. 39 However, the synod followed the Latin Church in 
believing the Union to be entirely a matter of the bishops’ 
competence, a position that conflicted with the rules gov-
erning the Eastern Church.40
Upon arriving at the synod, the Orthodox representa-
tives asked the Metropolitan about the order of the meet-
ing. The Orthodox synod invited Metropolitan Michael to 
38 Ekthesis albo krótkie zebranie spraw, które działy się na partykularnym 
tj.pomiastnym synodzie w Brześciu Litewskim, Cracow 1597, p. 334-340, 
357-358; See also the latest edition of M. Broniewski, Ekthesis albo krótkie 
zebranie spraw, które działy się na partykularnym tj.pomiastnym synodzie 
w Brześciu Litewskim, edited by J. Byliński i J. Długosz, Wrocław, 1994; 
H.  Pociej, Antirresis abo apologija przeciwko Krzysztofowi Philaletowi, 
który niedawno wydał książki imieniem starożytnej Rusi religiej greckiej 
przeciw książkom o synodzie brzeskim napisanym w Roku Pańskim 1597, 
eds. by J. Byliński i J. Długosz, Wrocław, 1997; Dokumenta Unionis 
Berestensis, p.  341-344; P. Skarga, Synod brzeski i jego obrona, Cracow, 
1997; A.  Mironowicz, Bractwa cerkiewne w Rzeczypospolitej, Białystok 
2003, p. 45-28. 
39  W. Antonovich, Predislovie, [in:] Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, ch.  I, 
vol. 4, Kyïv, 1871, p. 2; O. Lotots’kyi-Bilousenko, Ukrains’ki dzherela 
tserkovnoho prava, Warsaw, 1931, p. 119-120; A. Mironowicz, Kościół 
prawosławny w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, p. 63. 
40 Arkhiv Iugo- Zapadnoi Rossii, ch. I, vol. 1, Kyïv 1861, p. 509-517; Akty 
Zapadnoi Rossii, vol. IV, nr 106, p. 145. 
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participate in the discussion. In response, the Metropolitan 
called upon the Orthodox representatives at the synod to 
accept the Union and participate in common discussions 
with the Latin clergy. Given this response and with the sup-
port of the Orthodox participants present, on 17 October 
1596, protosingle Nicefor deprived those bishops who had 
subjected themselves to the Pope of their priestly rank and 
functions. The pro-union synod was notified of this deci-
sion in writing and the Orthodox participant sat as a sep-
arate council. Nicefor justified his decision by stating that 
the Metropolitan and the bishops had broken their oath of 
loyalty to the Patriarch, violated the decisions of the gen-
eral councils which forbade the bishops to move from the 
jurisdiction of one Patriarch to another, and had taken the 
decision on uniting the churches without the permission of 
the Patriarch, even though such a decision could only be 
made at a general council.  Exarch Nicefor further justified 
his decision by noting that the bishops had thrice rejected 
the council’s call. Finally, he reminded them that the Union 
was created without the agreement of the clergy and the 
faithful41.
Nicefor’s arguments were crucial for the Orthodox 
faithful, who sought ecclesiastical support in defending 
their rights. At the council, not only dependence on the 
Constantinopolitan patriarchate was stressed, but also its 
lawfulness and consistency with Eastern Church canons. 
The Ruthenian bishops’ obedience to the Pope was offi-
cially announced on the 8 October 1596 and the following 
day Metropolitan Michael excommunicated the Orthodox 
bishops and other participants of the Orthodox council in 
the name of the synod.42 The decisions of the Uniate-Catho-
lic synod were met with numerous protests from the Or-
thodox clergy and nobility. Both sides issued petitions to 
the king seeking to deprive members of the opposite side of 
their rank and functions.
The Orthodox council’s decisions were confirmed by 
the Constantinople patriarchate. A provisional governing 
body was introduced to take the place of the Ruthenian 
bishops who had accepted the Union. This body includ-
ed an appointed exarch, Balaban bishop of L’vov, the pro-
tosingle Cyril Lukarys, and the Rev. Constantin Ostrogski 
(1559-1608). The church union thus divided the Orthodox 
community into two groups – the Orthodox and the Uniate. 
This division followed neither diocesan nor administrative 
structures. The larger part of the clergy and the faithful, to-
gether with two Bishops  - Michael Kopystenski from Prze-
myśl and Gedeon Balaban from L’viv - remained in the Or-
thodox camp. However, the decisions of the union synod 
were accepted by most of the formerly Orthodox hierarchy 
and part of the clergy.  In contrast, the monastic clergy took 
41 A. Mironowicz, Orthodoxy and Uniatism at the End of Sixteenth 
Century and during the Seventeenth Century in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, [in:] Lithuania and Ruthenia. Studies of a Transcultural 
Communication Zone (15th-18th Centuries), Edited by Stefan Rohdewald, 
David Frick, Stefan Wiederkehr, Harrassowitz Verlag-Wiesbaden 2007, 
s. 190-209. 
42 Ekthesis albo krótkie zebranie spraw, p. 329-376; Dokumenta Unionis 
Berestensis, p. 336-338. 
an anti-union position and the secular believers followed 
their bishops as was the norm. This division is notable for 
the heavy participation of the protopopes (governors) of 
the L’viv and Przemyśl dioceses in the Orthodox synod.43 
Many clergymen in dioceses where the ordinaries had 
joined the union also stood against it. All the representa-
tives of the Orthodox nobility from the Kingdom of Poland 
and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania refused the union. The 
Ruthenian burghers, and especially the Orthodox Church 
brotherhoods, unanimously supported the decisions of the 
Orthodox council. The peasantry, excluded from the dis-
cussion, had no expressed opinion on the subject.44
***
Despite the failure of the Brest synod in fully uniting 
Orthodox and Roman churches, new union projects con-
cerning the Orthodox Church in Poland continued to arise 
after the reactivation of the Orthodox hierarchy by the Pa-
triarch of Jerusalem in 1620-1621.45 For example, sugges-
tions for a new synod came forward in the parliamentary 
sessions of 1623, 1629, and 1636. On 3 November 1643, 
Pope Urban VIII sent letters to the king, the Uniate and 
Roman Catholic hierarchy as well as secular dignitaries, 
outlining the conditions of a future union46. On the same 
day, Urban VIII (1623-1644) sent letters to the Metropoli-
tan Peter Mohyla (1633-1647) and castellan of Czernyhov 
Adam Kisiel (1639-1646): the Pope encouraged them to 
unite with the Roman church.47 King Ladislaŭ (Władysław) 
IV (1632-1648) as well as some magnates and Latin and 
Uniat bishops also encouraged union with Rome.
In response to the Pope’s call in 1644, an anonymous 
union memorial was sent to the Roman Curia; Peter Mo-
hyla and Adam Kisiel were said to be the memorial’s au-
thors.48 The authors strongly criticised the Union of Brest, 
43 M. Bendza, Prawosławna diecezja przemyska w latach 1596-1681. 
Studium historyczno-kanoniczne, Warsaw, 1982, p. 108-118. 
44 L. Bieńkowski, Organizacja Kościoła wschodniego w Polsce, [in:] 
J.  Kłoczowski, ed., Kościół w Polsce. Studia nad historią Kościoła 
Katolickiego w Polsce, vol. II, part 2, Cracow, 1969, p. 840. 
45 P. I. Orlovskii, Uchastie Zaporozgskikh kozakov v vostanovlenii 
ierusalimskim patriarkhom Teofanom pravoslavnoi iuzhno-Russkoi 
tserkovnoi erarchii w 1620 g.,  [in:] Trudy Kievskoi-Dukhovnoi Akademii 
1905 g., Kyïv, 1905, p. 648; J. Pelesz, Geschichte der Union..., vol. II, p. 145-148; 
Makarii, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi, vol. XI, p. 242-264; M. Hrushevs’kyi, 
Istoriia Ukrajiny-Rusy, vol. VII, p. 426-437; D. Doroshenko, Narys 
istorii Ukrainy, Warsaw, 1932, vol. I, p. 206-207; K. Chodynicki, Kościół 
prawosławny..., p. 425-429; J. Woliński, Polska i Kościół prawosławny. Zarys 
historyczny, Lwów, 1936, p. 72-73; W. Tomkiewicz, Cerkiew dyzunicka. 
W  dawnej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1596-1795, „Przegląd Powszechny”, 
vol. CIC, Kraków 1921-1922, p. 161-163; L. Bieńkowski, Organizacja 
Kościoła wschodniego..., p. 843-844; A. Mironowicz, Kościół prawosławny 
w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, p. 80-82. 
46 Monumenta Ucrainae Historica, vol. XI, Rome, 1974, p. 345-358; 
A. Mironowicz, Orthodoxy and Uniatism During the Seventeenth Century, 
[in:] Christianity in East Central Europe and Its Relations with the West and 
the East, Lublin 1996, p. 51-53. 
47  A. Theiner, Vetera Monumenta Poloniae..., p. 425; Documenta Ponti-
ficum Romanorum, vol. I, p. 530-531. 
48  The memorial was not an official document. It was published 
anonymously for reasons of personal safety; the authors feared the 
reaction of believers who opposed the union. For additional discussion 
on the union memorial,  see A. Velykyi, Anonimnyi proekt Petra Mohyly 
po zedynenniu Ukrainskoi Tserkvy 1645 r., “Analecta Ordinis S. Basili 
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presenting their own concept of linking the Orthodoxy 
with Rome. According to Mohyla, there were no essential 
differences between the Greek and Latin church as far as 
faith was concerned. The only differences separating the 
two churches appeared in their organisational structures 
and liturgical rites. The memorial treated both churches 
were treated as equal and apostolic. In the authors’ view, 
the Union of Brest could not serve as a model for unity for 
it lacked “pure and holy intentions”. The ostensible unity 
proclaimed at Brest had attempted to destroy the identi-
ty of the Eastern church. As a result, Mohyla’s and Kisiel’s 
project rejected the Union of Brest as a model since it 
broke the historical and ecclesiastical ties between the Or-
thodox community and Constantinople patriarchate. The 
basic concept underlying this memorial was the agreement 
of the clergy and the faithful with Rome, but without sev-
ering ties with Constantinople for it was the clergy and the 
faithful who were supposed to make the decision concern-
ing union. According to the memorial’s prescription, the 
Ruthenian church would remain an Eastern church with 
an unchanged liturgy. The Ruthenian Church could be 
subject organisationally to the Patriarch of Constantino-
ple and indirectly to Rome. Rome’s first reactions to the 
memorial were surprisingly positive, but ultimately the 
Congregation for the Propaganda of Faith in Rome rec-
ommended that the union be created according to rules set 
down by Rome.49 In reality, this decision meant the rejec-
tion of the memorial’s approach.
This was not the last union attempt aimed at the Or-
thodox Church in Poland in the seventeenth century. These 
various union projects were invariably an element of a plan 
by the Polish government and Rome to take over all Or-
thodox bishoprics and eradicate the Orthodox church. 
For example, during the parliamentary session of 7 March 
1667, a constitution was drawn up, which was supposed to 
attract Orthodox clergymen to the union.50  Attempts at 
union were also made by John Casimir (1648-1668) and 
continued under the rule of John III Sobieski (1674-1696). 
However, these plans had a completely different character 
than those previously developed for they were political ac-
tivities and should be viewed in the context of international 
politics. The war with Turkey and the attempts made by 
Rome to draw Russia into the union gave the Polish au-
thorities a pretext for anti-Orthodox actions. It should be 
remembered that in 1676 the Polish-Lithuanian parliament 
forbade the Orthodox to contact their head, the Patriarch 
of Constantinople, who was subjected to the Turkish sul-
Magni”, vol. VI, Rome 1963, p. 484-497; W. Hryniewicz, Unia bez 
zniszczenia. Memoriał  unijny  metropolity  Piotra Mohyły (1644-1645), 
„Studia i  dokumenty ekumeniczne”, R. IX, 1993, nr 1(31), p. 21-32; 
A.  Mironowicz, Prawosławie i unia za panowania Jana Kazimierza, 
Białystok, 1997, p.  68-70; ibid, Kościół prawosławny w dawnej Rzeczy-
pospolitej, p. 113-114. 
49  E. Rykaczewski, Relacje nuncjuszów apostolskich..., vol. II, p. 286-288; 
A. Mironowicz, Orthodoxy and Uniatism During the 17th  Century, [in:] 
Churches and Confessions in East Central Europe in Early Modern Times, 
ed. H. Łaszkiewicz, Lublin 1999, p. 74-77.
50  Volumina Legum, vol. IV, Petersburg 1859, p. 437, 474; A. Mironowicz, 
Kościół prawosławny w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, p. 207-208. 
tan. To better execute the will of parliament, the Orthodox 
brotherhoods, previously independent, were subjected di-
rectly to bishops.51 This act was an attempt at destroying 
the brotherhoods which had served as the main support 
of the Orthodox Church and constituted the main centres 
of anti-Union opposition. The  1676 constitution also at-
tempted to separate the Orthodox faithful from other Or-
thodox centres abroad. Warsaw’s policy towards the Ortho-
dox Church was also influenced by the king’s conviction 
that by enlarging the union he could gain Russia’s support 
against Turkey. The Roman Curia made similar attempts 
at the same time suggesting a religious union in Russia. 
Pope Innocent XI (1676-1689) appealed to the Polish king, 
queen, secular lords, and clergy to take action against the 
schismatics.52
Indeed, the Roman Curia transformed its policy re-
garding the Orthodox believers in Polish Ruthenia. It did 
not permit common Uniate-Orthodox synods which were 
supposed to lead to general union. Instead the existing un-
ion’s enlargement was to be carried out by convincing lo-
cal lords or placing Catholic-friendly bishops in Orthodox 
sees. The bishop of L’viv, Joseph Szumalski (1676-1700), 
secretly joined the Union in 1677. Two years earlier, he had 
been charged by John III Sobieski with administering the 
metropolitanate.
The union issue reappeared during the parliamenta-
ry session in 1681. The Orthodox were effectively repre-
sented only by the bishop of Lutsk, Gideon Czetwertynski 
(1663-1684), because the remaining two bishops were only 
formally “of the Greek faith”. During the session, Joseph 
Szumalski and bishop of Przemyśl, Innocenty Winnicki 
(1679-1691), formally repeated the Roman Catholic creed 
in Warsaw’s royal chapel.53 On 27 March 1681, both bish-
ops sent a letter to the Pope in which they assured him that 
they accepted his primacy and the dogmas of the Roman 
Catholic church.
When the Kyïv metropolitanate was subjected to the 
Patriarch of Moscow (1685) and incorporated into Mus-
covy’s state structure, through the Treaty of Grzymaltow, 
1686, the papacy and Polish authorities aimed to destroy 
completely the Orthodox church in Poland, fearing that 
they would now become allies of Moscow.  It was assumed 
that all Orthodox lords in the Commonwealth would join 
the Uniate Church. To achieve this aim, all Orthodox 
bishoprics were to be taken over by crypto-Uniates. Under 
51 Volumina Legum, vol. V, p. 180. The consequences of the departure 
from a policy of tolerance were successive constitutional parliaments 
discriminating against non-Roman Catholics.  For example, there were 
acts prohibiting conversion from Catholicism (1668), excluding non-
Catholics from becoming nobles (1673), as well as from deputy chambers 
and the more important official positions (1718, 1736, 1764). For more 
details, see:  J. Kłoczowski, L. Müllerowa, J. Skarbek, Zarys dziejów 
Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce, Cracow 1986, p. 104-109; W. A. Serczyk, 
Unia brzeska - refleksje o tolerancji, [in:] T. Stegner, ed., Unia brzeska i jej 
następstwa. Materiały z sesji naukowej..., Gdańsk, 1991; A. Mironowicz, 
Prawosławie i unia w dziejach narodu białoruskiego, „Przegląd Wschodni”, 
vol. XII, no.. 2 (46), Warszawa 2012, p. 275-309.  
52  Documenta Pontificium Romanorum, vol. I, p. 631-634.  
53  Monumenta Ucrainae Historica, vol. IV, p. 107; A. Mironowicz, Kościół 
prawosławny w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, p. 225-226. 
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the authorities’ pressure, the bishop of L’viv Joseph Szum-
lański officially accepted the Pope’s jurisdiction in 1700. 
Two years later, the bishop of Lutsk, Dionizy Zabokrzycki 
(1695-1702), did the same. Along with the lords, many 
monasteries and parishes joined the union under official 
pressure. For example, the Brotherhood of L’viv accepted 
the Uniate bishop’s dominion in 1702. When three bish-
ops joined the Union, the Orthodox church in the Pol-
ish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was reduced to a single 
Belorusan bishopric, in Mahilioŭ54. This state of affairs 
remained unchanged until the Commonwealth’s fall in 
1795.
***
The Vatican’s interest in the Orthodox Church in Cen-
tral Europe was renewed at the end of the First World War. 
On 1 April 1917, the Pope created the Congregation for 
the Oriental Churches (Congregatio pro Ecclesiis Oriental-
ibus) which was given responsibility for all issues relating 
to the activities of all the Eastern denominations. In 1925, 
the Pro Russia commission was formed within this congre-
gation and a Jesuit centre for the training of Eastern rite 
missionaries was created in Innsbruck.  A similar centre 
was formed at the Roman Catholic University in Saltsburg. 
In 1930, the Pro Russia comission was separated from the 
congregation and reported straight to the Pope. The com-
mission took control over missionary activity among Rus-
sians, especially those living outside the Soviet Union and 
including Russians living in Poland.
Along with the new Eastern policy of the Vatican, Pol-
ish bishops prepared plans for missionary activity among 
Orthodox believers in the new Polish state erected after 
World War I. In 1923, the bishop of Podlahia, Henryk 
Przeździecki, (initiated these activities and he travelled to 
Rome with a plan for popularize a Catholic Church of the 
Bizantine-Slavic rite in Poland. On 21 January 1924, Pope 
Pius XI granted Bishop Przeździecki the right to form Uni-
ate parishes “wherever the people demand.” This right was 
stretched to the Latin dioceses on the  eastern rim of Po-
land – Lublin, Lutsk, Pinsk, and Vilnius. This region and 
the bishopric of Podhalia became the target of unionist ac-
tivities in Poland.55
The new Byzantine-Slavic rite accepted and completely 
preserved the distinct rituals of the Eastern Church, while 
accepting the Pope as head of the Church, adding the fil-
ioque to church dogma, and introducing a few Roman 
Catholic holidays to the liturgical calendar. The synodal 
Russian rite [not sure what is meant here] was adjusted to 
Catholic dogmatics.  Church Slavonic remained the litur-
54  See: A. Mironowicz, Diecezja białoruska w XVII i XVIII wieku, 
Białystok 2008.
55  Z. Waszkiewicz, Neounia – nieudany eksperyment?, [in:] St. Alexan-
drowicz and T. Kempa, eds., Czterechsetlecie zawarcia unii brzeskiej 
1596-1996 Toruń, 1998, p. 128-129; F. Rzemieniuk, Kościół katolicki 
obrządku bizantyjsko-słowiańskiego. Neounia, Lublin, 1999, p. 57; 
A. Mironowicz, Neounia w II Rzeczypospolitej, [in:] Kościół Greckokatolicki 
na Warmii i Mazurach, ed. M. Melnyka, Olsztyn 2006, p. 11-16; ibid., 
Neounija wo Wtoroj Rieczi Pospolitoj, „Seminarium Hortus Humanitatis”, 
vol. XV, Riga 2008, p. 64-66.
gical language, but sermons were given in the vernacular – 
Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian or Polish. The appearance 
of Byzantine-Slavic rite churches and liturgical vestments 
remained unchanged from their Orthodox past. The Pope’s 
instructions stated that until a separate church hierarchy 
was created, the clergy and faithful of this new rite would 
be subject to the local Latin Church authorities. The Pope 
suggested spreading the neo-Uniate rite through mission-
ary and charity activities. It was assumed that missionary 
work with Orthodox believers, based on the completely 
new rite, would be effective in winning them over to the 
Pope.56
In 1930, a Lithuanian priest, Francis Buczys, Superior 
General of the Marian order, was consecrated as the new 
bishop of the Byzantine-Slavic rite.  To address any needs 
of the new union in Poland, the Pope appointed a new Ap-
ostolic Visitor, the Rev. Mikołaj Czarnecki in 1931. The 
new bishop, who was Ukrainian, belonged to the Eastern 
branch of the Redemptorist order.57 The Roman Catholic 
episcopate supported the new rite’s development in Poland. 
The bishops of the eastern Latin dioceses (Lublin, Lutsk, 
Pinsk, Podlahia and Vilnius) in particular spoke out strong-
ly in favour of missionary activity. Special periodicals were 
issued to popularize the new union – “Oriens” in Polish, 
“Khristianin” and “K soedineniiu” in Russian, “Kitezh” and 
“Da zlucheninia” in Byelorussian.58 The action of convert-
ing Orthodox believers in Volhynia was supported by the 
Roman Catholic press, such as “Życie Katolickie” (issued 
by the Roman Catholic curia in Lutsk) and “Przegląd Ka-
tolicki”.
The results of the new union action were unimpres-
sive when compared to the efforts and resources devoted 
to it. According to the Ministry of Religious Denomina-
tions and Public Enlightenment, in 1927 there were twen-
ty-eight neo-Uniate parishes, thirty clergymen, and 17,000 
faithful. In 1935, official Roman Catholic Church statistics 
listed thirty-two diocese clergymen, twenty-six monks, 
thirty-two alumni of the Seminar in Dubin, forty-five 
parishes, and 18,000 faithful. On the other hand, ministry 
statistics list forty-three parishes and 17,000 believers for 
1938.59 In the opinion of the Polish Ministry of the Interi-
or, the number of neo-Uniate parishes cited by the Church 
had been enlarged for propaganda. According to recent 
data, the number of followers in the Byzantine-Slavic rite 
in 1930 equaled 14,443, in 1934 – 15,960, and in 1939 – 
16,649.60 In fact, the overall number of neo-Uniats ranged 
from 17,000 to 18,000 and was not greater than the num-
ber of Uniates who converted to Orthodoxy during this 
56  B. Łomacz, Praca duszpasterska duchowieństwa neounickiego, „Novum” 
1980, nr 5, p. 95-103; A. Mironowicz, Kościół prawosławny na ziemiach 
polskich w XIX i XX wieku, Białystok 2005, p. 141-147.
57  A. Svitich, Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ w Pol’she i ee avtokefaliia, Buenos 
Aires, 1959,  p. 194.
58 M. Papieżyńska-Turek, Między tradycją a rzeczywistością, p. 410; 
A. Mironowicz, The Orthodox Church in Poland, Supraśl 2005, p. 45.
59 Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia 
Publicznego, 381, k. 169, 320; M. Pirożyński, Statystyka Kościoła w Polsce, 
Lublin, 1935, p. 16-17; Z. Waszkiewicz, Neounia, p. 142-143.
60 Ibid., p. 138-139; A. Mironowicz, The Orthodox Church in Poland, p. 46.
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period. The problem of the new union as well as the con-
flicts connected with it ended with the beginning of the 
Second World War61.
***
After the Second World War very few Uniate parishes 
remained under the jurisdiction of Latin bishops, due to 
boundary changes. It was only after 1989 that the Uniates 
separated from the Latin church structure in Poland. Two 
Greek Catholic dioceses of the Ukrainian rite were created 
by the Pope and given wide autonomy within the Roman 
Catholic church. As a result, Uniate hierarchy and clergy 
were able to demand the return of some church properties. 
With the 400th anniversary of the Brest Council, the Union 
of Brest and its consequences for the Christian community 
returned in academic literature. 
Despite aims of unification, attempts at church union 
has had a negative influence on the relations between the 
Roman Catholic and Polish Orthodox Churches in con-
temporary Poland. The Roman Catholic side disregards the 
negative effects of union projects for the Church and Po-
land. Neither does it seem to notice the conclusions of the 
61  A. Mironowicz, L’ Église orthodoxe en Pologne au XX siècle, [in:] 
L’ Église orthodoxe en Europe orientale au XX siècle, sous la direction de 
Christine Chaillot, Paris 2009, p. 229-248.
Commission for Ecumenical Dialogue held in Balamand, 
Lebanon, in 1993. That commission concluded that all 
forms of Uniatism not only failed to restore unity between 
the Churches but caused even further fragmentation. As a 
result, the Uniate experience cannot be an example for ecu-
menical dialogue between churches62. 
When insisting on the conversion to Roman Catholi-
cism of people who are already Christians, either individu-
ally or in groups, it is difficult to distinguish Uniatism from 
simple proselytism. As a result, Uniatism and proselytism 
from other Christian faiths remains a source of division 
and conflict among Christian denominations. Poland’s ex-
perience with attempts at unification of the Orthodox and 
Roman Catholic Churches demonstrates that attempts to 
subjugate the Orthodox to the Popes did not lead to unity 
between Churches but became the reason for new religious 
and social conflicts.  Church unions in Poland, because of 
their aims and consequences, have not been accepted in the 
modern ecumenical movement.  The conclusion of cen-
turies of attempts at unification under the Pope has been 
fragmentation and division.
62  A. Mironowicz, (Άντώνιος Μιρόνοδιτς), ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΣΤΙΚΕΣ ΟΥΝΙΕΣ 
ΣΤΑ ΠΟΛΩΝΙΚΑ ΕΔΑΦΗ ΚΑΙ ΟΙ ΣΥΝΕΠΕΙΕΣ ΑΥΤΩΝ „ΟΙΚΟΥ-
ΜΕΝΙΣΜΟΣ Γένέση-Προσδοκίες-Διαψεύσεις”, ΤΟΜΟΣ Β, ΘΕΣΣΑ-
ΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2009, p. 743-767.
Rozmiar artykułu: 1,55 arkusza wydawniczego
